When I first saw the news confirming the rumors that the U.S. was going to take a 10% stake in Intel, the only thing I could think of was a scene from the classic mob movie, Goodfellas. If you know the movie, you probably remember the scene. The crime boss, Big Paulie, says, “What do I know about the restaurant business?”

In the movie, a desperate restaurant owner — beaten down and threatened by a mobster — offers a piece of his business to Paulie, the family boss, in exchange for protection. Paulie plays coy, but accepts. The result? They run the place into the ground, rack up debts, funnel stolen goods through it, and eventually torch the place for insurance money.

Let’s hope Intel doesn’t meet the same fate.

A Dangerous Precedent Wrapped in Silicon

Seriously, there are so many things that are just plain wrong with this situation. Let’s break it down:

1. Socialism? Fascism? You Pick.

In political theory, there are two forms of government where the state owns or controls the means of production: socialism and fascism. The difference is mostly branding. One wraps itself in the language of equity, the other in nationalism. Either way, when the government becomes an equity stakeholder in the private sector — especially in a foundational industry like semiconductors — we’ve crossed a line. And it’s not a subtle one.

2. Anti-Competitive By Design

The idea of rebuilding America’s semiconductor capacity is a worthy goal — one I support. But handing a 10% stake of the most powerful American chip company to the federal government? That’s not catalyzing a competitive marketplace — that’s picking a winner and daring anyone to try and compete. How are startups, second-tier players, or even private competitors supposed to attract funding or government support now? Why would you bet on anyone other than Uncle Sam’s house brand?

This starts to sound more like a Soviet-style industry policy than the free market leadership we claim to champion.

3. Global Chip Wars, Accelerated

Let’s not be naive. Every major government already subsidizes their semiconductor industry. But when the U.S. literally takes an ownership stake in a top-five global player, it’s not just “support” anymore — it’s direct competition with foreign governments. How long before China triples down on SMIC or Europe funnels more funds into ASML? The age of “chip sovereignty” just went nuclear.

4. So Much for the Moral High Ground

For decades, the U.S. has lectured the world about free markets, open trade, and keeping governments out of the boardroom. Now? We’re the ones propping up “national champions.” How do we look the WTO — or our allies — in the eye and say, “Don’t distort your markets,” when we’re distorting ours with this deal?

5. Intel has a Government Contractor-in-Chief?

Let’s be honest: Intel has had its challenges. Leadership churn, manufacturing delays, missed technology cycles. They’ve been in the fight of their life to stay relevant. But with the government as your biggest shareholder, how much room do you really have to maneuver?

Will Intel be forced into “strategic partnerships” it doesn’t want? Told to build fabs where the votes are instead of where the engineers are? Will the next CEO be chosen by the White House rather than the boardroom? It sure does seem like Intel’s CEO may have saved his job with taking this deal. Now we know why Trump went from calling for his immediate resignation to praising him after one meeting.

You think this is far-fetched? Ask Boeing how that story plays out.

6. Export Fees Were Just the Start

This is a significant step up from the 15% export license fees the government just announced 2 weeks ago for NVIDIA and AMD exports to China. That was the opening act. This Intel move is something altogether different. It’s not about taxing exports. It’s about becoming the boss.

The U.S. isn’t just setting policy anymore. It’s setting strategy. Budget lines in D.C. are now boardroom decisions in Silicon Valley. We’re not just refereeing the game — we’re fielding a team. That’s a dangerous shift, especially from a government not known for nimble innovation or business efficiency.

Didn’t We Try This During the Great Recession?

Now, to be fair, this isn’t the first time the U.S. government has taken equity stakes in private industry. During the Great Recession, the Treasury took large positions in banks and automakers like GM and Chrysler. But those deals were structured very differently:

• The government’s role was explicitly temporary.
• It was understood as a backstop, not a strategic partnership.
• The goal was to stabilize, exit, and return the firms to the private sector ASAP.

And they did. The U.S. recouped most of its money — and got out of the way.

But that’s not what we’re seeing here. There’s no exit plan. No clear path to divest. No stated goal to return Intel to a fully private entity. If anything, this looks more like a long-term entanglement — and Intel is too valuable, too foundational, and too exposed to be the guinea pig in a new industrial strategy.

Crossing a Neon Line

Let’s be clear: I’m not accusing the U.S. government of being a mob family. But when you start taking stakes in companies, favoring some over others, dictating strategy by ownership rather than persuasion — well, you’ve left the free-market reservation. We’re not a kleptocracy. We’re not a central planned economy.

Or at least, we weren’t.

Intel’s problems won’t be solved by giving it a government chaperone. And America’s semiconductor future won’t be secured by playing kingmaker. We need competition. We need innovation. We need private capital to flow freely into bold ideas — not just to the company with a federal co-signer.

Big Paulie didn’t know anything about the restaurant business. Let’s hope Washington knows better about chips. Because if this goes the Goodfellas route, we all end up paying the bill.