China’s growing influence over critical minerals could threaten the supply chains needed to build quantum computers and related communications systems, according to a new study from researchers at Stanford University, Los Alamos National Laboratory and the Centre for International Governance Innovation.
The research paper argues that current government frameworks for critical minerals are poorly suited to quantum technology. Many quantum systems depend on small volumes of highly specialized materials. These obscure inputs can determine whether a quantum processor or detector can be built and maintained.
The quantities of these minerals used in quantum development, though tiny, are absolutely essential. All of the hyperscalers use some element of specialized critical materials in their quantum efforts. Google’s Willow chip, a pioneering effort in quantum, uses indium. IBM, widely seen as the market leader in the emerging sector, uses niobium in its quantum chips.
China’s Aggressive Strategy
Niobium is used in Josephson junctions, the core circuit element in many leading quantum machines, and the US imports all of its niobium. While Brazil dominates production, Chinese companies have invested heavily in Brazilian niobium producers, giving Beijing influence over a mineral essential for quantum systems.
Nickel presents another risk. Superconducting quantum computers require shielding from stray magnetic fields, often using nickel-iron alloys. Although US nickel import dependence is lower than its niobium dependence, China has extensive influence over Indonesian nickel refining, giving the country a potential supply constraint.
The concern is not only a hard cutoff of supply. China has shown that licensing rules and export procedures can move markets unpredictably. Its export restrictions over materials such as bismuth, antimony, gallium, germanium and rare earth elements have raised alarms across semiconductor and quantum supply chains. Even a temporary interruption is a problem because qualified suppliers and components can take years to validate.
Proposed Solution
The research study proposes a Quantum Criticality and Critical Minerals dashboard. The tool would track inventory metrics, substitution options, qualification timelines, geopolitical signals and other key levels. The goal is to give governments and allied quantum firms earlier warning before a materials issue becomes a program-level failure.
The tool may well be needed, because China is accelerating its own quantum ecosystem. Beijing has invested for decades in quantum research, including regional innovation clusters and domestic suppliers. Chinese groups have advanced in quantum communications, superconducting systems, photonic platforms, neutral-atom machines, sensors and related components. China has also pushed to reduce reliance on Western equipment, including dilution refrigerators used to cool superconducting quantum computers.
In the face of this aggressive strategy, Western export-control strategy may be limited. Restrictions on quantum equipment may slow China in some areas, but they can also create incentives for domestic substitution. For instance, in China’s emerging cryogenics sector, controls and entity listings helped create a market for local suppliers. Still, major gaps remain for China, including helium-3, high-performance cryocoolers, certain amplifiers and independently verified system reliability.
For enterprise tech leaders, some of whom are planning migration to post-quantum cryptography, the report is a wake-up call. The report indicates that quantum’s evolution is threatened by the materials and manufacturing networks that make those systems possible.
